Scientific research funding is allocated largely through a system of soliciting and ranking competitive grant proposals. In these competitions, the proposals themselves are not the deliverables that the funder seeks, but instead are used by the funder to screen for the most promising research ideas. Consequently, some of the funding program's impact on science is squandered because applying researchers must spend time writing proposals instead of doing science. To what extent does the community's aggregate investment in proposal preparation negate the scientific impact of the funding program? Are there alternative mechanisms for awarding funds that advance science more efficiently? We use the economic theory of contests to analyze how efficiently grant-proposal competitions advance science, and compare them to recently proposed, partially randomized alternatives such as lotteries. We find that the effort researchers waste in writing proposals may be comparable to the total scientific value of the research that the funding supports, especially when only a few proposals can be funded. Moreover, when professional pressures motivate investigators to seek funding for reasons that extend beyond the value of the proposed science (e.g., promotion, prestige), the entire program can actually hamper scientific progress when the number of awards is small. We suggest that lost efficiency may be restored either by partial lotteries for funding, or by funding researchers based on past scientific success instead of proposals for future work.
Over the past fifty years, research funding in the United States has failed to keep pace with growth in scientific activity. Funding rates in grant competitions have plummeted, 1 and researchers spend far more time writing grant proposals than they did in the past [5] . A large survey of top U.S. universities found that, on average, faculty devote 8% of their total time -and 19% of their time available for research activities -towards preparing grant proposals [6] . Anecdotally, medical school faculty may spend fully half their time or more seeking grant funding [5, 7] . While the act of writing a proposal may have some intrinsic scientific value [8] -perhaps by helping an investigator sharpen ideas -much of the effort given to writing proposals is effort taken away from doing science. With respect to scientific progress, this time is wasted [9] . * krgross@ncsu.edu † cbergst@u.washington.edu 1 At NIH, funding rates for R01 and equivalents have fallen from ∼ 58% in the early 1960s to ∼ 20% in recent years [1]; see Fig. S1 . At NSF, funding rates for new proposals in FY1975 ranged from 30% -63% across 10 large programs, with a median of 46% [2, p. 176]. For FY2013-FY2016, NSF reports an agency-wide funding rate of 23% for full proposals [3, p. 5], although this rate does not factor in submissions rejected as pre-proposals. Including pre-proposals reduces the overall funding rate considerably; for example, the Division of Environmental Biology reports an overall funding rate of 7-8% for the same period [4] .
Frustrated with the inefficiencies of the current funding system, some researchers have called for an overhaul of the prevailing funding model [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . In particular, Fang & Casadevall [15] recently suggested a qualifying lottery, in which proposals are rated as worthy of funding or not, and then a subset of the worthy proposals are randomly selected to receive funds. Arguments in favor of a qualifying lottery include reduced demographic bias, increased transparency, and a hedge against the impossibility of forecasting how scientific projects will unfold [15] . Indeed, at least two funding organizations -the Health Research Council of New Zealand and the Volkswagen Foundation -have recently begun using qualifying lotteries to fund riskier, more exploratory science.
Compared to a proposal competition, a lottery permits more proposals to qualify for funding and thus lowers the bar that applicants must clear. A lottery also offers a lower reward for success, as a successful proposal receives a chance at funding, not a guarantee of funding. Thus we expect that investigators applying to a qualifying lottery will invest less time and fewer resources in writing a proposal. To a first approximation, then, a proposal competition funds high-value projects while wasting substantial researcher time on proposal preparation, whereas a qualifying lottery would fund lower-value projects on average but would reduce the time wasted writing proposals. It is not obvious which system will have the greater net benefit for scientific progress.
In this article, we study the merits and costs of traarXiv:1804.03732v2 [physics.soc-ph] 14 Jun 2018 ditional proposal competitions versus qualifying lotteries by situating both within the rich economic theory of contests. In this theory, competing participants make costly investments ("bids") in order to win one or more prizes [16, 17] . Participants differ in key attributes, such as ability and opportunity cost, that determine their optimal strategies. In an economics context, contests are often used by the organizer as a mechanism to elicit effort from the participants. 2 However, because the participants' attributes influence their optimal strategies, the bids that participants submit reveal those attributes. Thus, screening of participants often arises as a side effect.
In funding competitions, the organizer is a funding body and the participants are competing investigators. Investigators pitch project ideas of varying scientific value by preparing costly proposals. However, unlike a traditional economic contest, the funding body's primary objective is to identify the most promising science, using proposals to screen for high-value ideas. The funding body has little interest in eliciting work during the competition itself, as the proposals are not the deliverables the funder seeks. All else equal, the funding agency would prefer to minimize the work that goes into preparing proposals, to leave as much time as possible for investigators to do science. In this case, how should the funder organize the contest to support promising science without squandering much of the program's benefit on time wasted writing proposals?
Below, we pursue this question by presenting and analyzing a contest model for scientific funding competitions. We first use the model to assess the efficiency of proposal competitions for promoting scientific progress, and ask how that efficiency depends on how many proposals are funded. We next explore how efficiency is impacted when extra-scientific incentives such as professional advancement motivate scientists to pursue funding, and compare the efficiency of proposal competitions to qualifying lotteries. Finally, we reflect on alternative ways to improve the efficiency of funding competitions without adding intentional randomness to the award process.
A CONTEST MODEL FOR SCIENTIFIC FUNDING COMPETITIONS
Our model draws upon the framework of Moldovanu & Sela [16] . In our application, a large number of scientists (or research teams) compete for grants to be awarded by a funding body. The funder can fund a proportion p of the competing investigators. We call p the payline, although p could be smaller than the proportion of in-2 For example, TopCoder and Kaggle are a popular contest platforms for tech firms (the organizers) to solicit programming or data-analysis effort from freelance workers (the participants).
vestigators who are funded if some investigators do not enter the competition. Project ideas vary in their scientific value, which we write as v, where v ≥ 0. In this case, scientific value combines the abilities of the investigator and the promise of the idea itself. Although we do not assign specific units to v, scientific value can be thought of as some measure of scientific progress, such as the expected number of publications or discoveries. The funder seeks to advance science by maximizing the scientific value of the projects that it funds, minus the value of the science that investigators forgo while writing proposals. However, the funder cannot observe the value of a project idea directly. Instead the funder evaluates proposals for research projects, and awards grants to the top-ranked proposals. Assume that proposals can be prepared to different strengths, denoted x ≥ 0, with a larger value of x corresponding to a stronger proposal. A scientist with a project idea of value v must decide how much effort to invest in writing a proposal, that is, to what strength x her proposal should be prepared. In our model, this decision is made by a cost-benefit optimization.
On the benefit side, if a proposal is funded, the investigator receives a reward equal to the scientific value of project, or v. This reward is public, in the sense that it benefits both the investigator and the funder. Receiving a grant may also bestow an extra-scientific reward on the recipient, such as prestige, promotion, or professional acclaim. Write this extra-scientific reward as v 0 ≥ 0. This extra-scientific reward is private, as it benefits only the grant recipient, and not the funder. Let η(x) be the equilibrium probability that a proposal of strength x is funded; η(x) will be a non-decreasing function of x. Thus, in expectation, an investigator with a project of value v who prepares a proposal of strength x receives a benefit of (v 0 + v)η(x).
Preparing a grant proposal also entails a disutility cost, equal to the value of the science that the investigator could have produced with the time and resources invested in writing. Let c(v, x) give the disutility cost of preparing a proposal of strength x for a project of value v. Here, we study the case where c(v, x) is a separable function of v and x, so we set c(v, x) = g(v)h(x). Proposal competitions are effective screening devices because it is easier to write a strong proposal about a good idea than about a poor one. Therefore, g(v) is a decreasing function of v, i.e., g (v) < 0. For a given idea, it takes more work to write a stronger proposal, and thus h (x) > 0. Finally, we assume that preparing a zero-strength proposal is tantamount to opting out of the competition, which can be done at zero cost. Thus h(0) = 0.
Preparing a proposal has some scientific value of its own through the sharpening of ideas that writing a proposal demands [8] . Let k ∈ [0, 1) be the proportion of the disutility cost c(v, x) that an investigator recoups by honing her ideas. We call the recouped portion of the disutility cost the intrinsic scientific value of writing a proposal. The portion of the disutility cost that cannot 1. An investigator prepares her grant proposal to the strength that maximizes her payoff. The blue curve shows the expected benefit to the investigator, which is determined by the project's value, any extra-scientific reward that the investigator receives from getting the grant, the probability of receiving funding, and the intrinsic value of writing a proposal. The red curve shows the disutility cost of preparing a proposal. The investigator's payoff is the difference between the benefit and the cost. The vertical line shows the bid (eq. 1) -the proposal strength that maximizes the payoff. At the bid, the ratio of the payoff (given by the length of the solid vertical line) to the cost (given by the length of the dashed vertical line) gives the investigator's return on her investment.
be recouped is scientific waste. All told, the total benefit to the investigator of preparing a proposal to strength x is (v 0 + v)η(x) + kc(v, x), and the total cost is c(v, x). The difference between the benefit and the cost is the investigator's payoff. The investigator's optimal proposal (or, in economic terms, her "bid") maximizes this payoff ( Fig. 1) :
For simplicity, we assume that variation among projects is captured entirely in the distribution of v, which we write as F (v). However, substituting c(v, x) = g(v)h(x) and dividing the payoff through by (1 − k)g(v) shows that our results also hold for any mechanism that creates equivalent variation in
The challenge in finding the payoff-maximizing bid b(v) is that the equilibrium probability of funding, η(x), must be determined endogeneously, in a way that is consistent with both the payline p and the distribution of bids that investigators submit. In the appendix, we follow Hoppe, Moldovanu & Sela [18] to show that, at equilibrium, the bid function is given by
In eq. 2, ξ(v) = η(b(v)) is the equilibrium probability that an idea of value v is funded. The particular form of ξ(v) depends on how much randomness is introduced during the review process, which we discuss below.
Scientific efficiency
We use the model to explore how efficiently the grant competition advances science. From the perspective of an individual investigator, the investigator's return on her investment (ROI) is the ratio of her payoff to the cost of her bid:
(3) An investigator will never choose to write a proposal that generates a negative payoff (because she can always obtain a payoff of 0 by opting out), and thus her ROI must be ≥ 0.
3
To analyze the funding program's impact on scientific progress as a whole, we compare the total value of the science that the funding program supports to the total value of the science that has been squandered preparing proposals. Of course, both of these quantities will be confounded with the number of grants that are funded, so we standardize to a per-funded-proposal basis. In notation, the average scientific value per funded proposal is
and the average scientific waste per funded proposal is
We will refer to the difference between these two quantities as the scientific gain (or loss, should it be negative) per funded proposal, which is our measure of the funding program's scientific efficiency. Note that while an investigator will never enter a grant competition against her own self interest, there is no guarantee that the scientific value per funded proposal will exceed the scientific waste. This is because the investigator's payoff includes private, extra-scientific rewards obtained by winning a grant (v 0 ), and (in our accounting, at least) these extra-scientific rewards do not benefit the funding agency. If extra-scientific motivations for winning grants are large enough, investigators may enter a grant competition even when doing so decreases their scientific productivity. If enough investigators are motivated accordingly, then the scientific progress sacrificed to writing proposals could exceed the scientific value of the funding program. In this case, the grant competition would operate at a loss to science, and the funding agency could do more for science by eschewing the proposal competition and spreading the money evenly among active researchers in the field, or by giving the money to researchers selected entirely at random.
ANALYSIS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
We illustrate the model's behavior by choosing a few possible sets of parameter values. Our parameter choices are not explicitly informed by data. Thus, while the numerical examples illustrate the model's possible behavior, we highlight the results that generalize more broadly. Throughout, we use the following baseline set of parameters. We assume that the project values, v, have a triangular distribution ranging from v min = 0.25 to v max = 1 with a mode at v min , such that low-value ideas are common and high-value ideas are rare. 4 For the cost function, we choose c(v, x) = x 2 /v. We choose a convex dependence on x to suggest that the costs of improving a proposal accelerate as a proposal becomes stronger. We assume that the intrinsic scientific value of writing a proposal allows investigators to recoup k = 1/3 of the disutility cost of proposal preparation. We first explore the case when investigators are motivated purely by the scientific value of their projects (v 0 = 0), and then introduce extra-scientific benefits (v 0 = 0.25). In the SI, we provide parallel results with two alternative parameter sets.
The evaluation process by which review panels rank proposals introduces a layer of randomness to the awarding of grants [19] [20] [21] . To capture noisy assessment, we use a bivariate copula [22] to specify the joint distribution of a proposal's actual quantile, and its quantile as assessed by the funding agency's review panel. A bivariate copula is a probability distribution on the unit square that has uniformly distributed marginals, as all quantiles must. We use a Clayton copula [23] , which allows for accurate assessment of weak proposals, but noisier assessment of strong proposals (Fig. S2 ). This choice is motivated by the pervasive notion that review panels can readily distinguish strong proposals from weak ones, but struggle to discriminate among strong proposals [15, 21, 24] . A Clayton copula has a single parameter (θ) that controls how tightly its two components are correlated. Rather arbitrarily, we use θ = 10 in the baseline parameter set. The Clayton copula has the important property that a proposal's probability of funding increases monotonically as its strength increases, regardless of the payline. Thus, we exclude the possibility that panels systematically favor weaker proposals. By using a copula, we implicitly assume that η(x) depends on x only through its rank. In the SI, we show how a copula leads to an equation for ξ (v), which can then be plugged in to eq. 2. Fig. 2 shows numerical results for the baseline parameters at generous (p = 45%) and low (p = 15%) paylines. In this particular case, investigators' payoffs fall faster than costs as paylines drop, leading to a reduced ROI for everyone at the lower payline (Fig. 2B ). We will argue below that every investigator's ROI must inevitably fall when the payline becomes small (see Figs. S3-S4 for additional examples). From the funding agency's perspective, with our baseline parameters, both the average scientific value and average waste per funded proposal increase as the payline falls, for paylines below 50% (Fig. 3A) . However, as the payline decreases, waste escalates more quickly than scientific value, reducing the scientific gain per funded project (Fig. 3B) . This same result also appears in our alternative parameter sets (Fig. S5-S6 ). We will argue below that the decline in scientific efficiency at low paylines is an inevitable if unfortunate characteristic of proposal competitions.
Clearly, quantitative details of the model's predictions depend on the parameter inputs. To understand the robustness of these predictions, it helps to study the case where panels discriminate perfectly among proposals. While perfect discrimination is obviously unrealistic in practice, it yields a powerful and general set of results which illuminate how the model behaves when discrimination is imperfect. Numerical results for perfect discrimination under the baseline parameter set appear in Figs. S7-S8. At equilibrium under perfect assessment, every project above a threshold value v = F −1 (1 − p) will receive funding, and no project idea below this threshold will be funded. Investigators with projects of value v > v all prepare proposals to the identical strength
, and are funded with certainty. Investigators with projects of value v < v opt out (Fig. S7) . All of the subsequent results follow. (Details appear in the SI.) First, as paylines drop, all investigators realize either a diminishing or zero ROI, because investigators who remain in the competition must pay a higher cost for a reduced payoff. Second, the average scientific value per funded proposal must increase as paylines drop, because only the highest-value projects are funded under low paylines. Third, in the limiting case when only one of many proposals can be funded 5 , the scientific value and scientific waste associated with the last funded project converge, and science is no better off than if no grant had been given at all. 6 (Fig. S8 ).
With perfect assessment, there is no general relationship between the scientific efficiency of a proposal competition and the payline that holds across the full range of paylines.
7 Of course, we wouldn't expect scientific efficiency to decline monotonically with a falling payline, because there are likely some low-value projects that can be weeded out at low cost. However, our last result above guarantees that the scientific gain per funded proposal must eventually vanish as the payline declines to a single award.
Returning to the reality of imperfect discrimination, as long as review panels do not systematically favor weaker proposals, noisy assessment changes little about these qualitative results. That is, investigators' ROIs will drop as paylines become fall, the average scientific value per funded proposal will increase as paylines decrease, and the scientific efficiency of the proposal competition must eventually decline as the payline approaches a single award. But efficiency need not drop to zero. Perhaps counterintuitively, imperfect discrimination is a saving grace at low paylines. Noisy assessment discourages top investigators from pouring excessive effort into grant-writing as paylines fall, because the marginal benefit of writing an even better grant becomes small when review panels struggle to discriminate among top proposals. Indeed, noisy assessment, unlike perfect discrimination, allows a proposal competition to retain a positive impact on science even with a single funded grant (compare Figs. 3 and S8 ). This result hints at the salutary nature of randomness at low paylines, which we will see more vividly when we consider lotteries below.
Thus far, we have considered the case where investigators are motivated only by the scientific value of the projects proposed (v 0 = 0). Now suppose that investigators are additionally motivated by the extra-scientific benefits of receiving a grant, such as professional advancement or prestige (v 0 > 0). Eq. 2 shows that adding extra-scientific motivation will increase the effort that investigators devote to preparing grant proposals. However, in our model at least, this extra effort has no bearing on which grants are funded, and thus does not affect the scientific value of the grants that are awarded. Increasing scientific costs without increasing scientific value will clearly be detrimental to the funding program's scientific efficiency. Extra-scientific benefits to investigators can even cause the entire funding program to operate at a loss to science when paylines are low (Fig. 3) .
scientific waste per funded proposal will exceed the average scientific value per funded proposal by exactly v 0 . 7 Hoppe et al. [18] show that if the cost function is independent of v, then a sharp result is available here for some distributions of v. Unfortunately, in the present context, it is difficult to argue that the costs of proposal preparation are independent of v.
LOTTERIES
Our model can also be used to analyze the efficiency of a qualifying lottery for advancing science. Suppose that a fraction q ≥ p of proposals qualify for the lottery, and each qualifying proposal is equally likely to be chosen for funding. Call q the "lottery line". Now, the investigator's payoff is (p/q)(v 0 + v)η l (x) − (1 − k)c(v, x) , where η l (x) is the equilibrium probability that the proposal qualifies for the lottery. In the SI, we show that the investigator's bid is given by
where
Our major result for lotteries is that measures of scientific efficiency -expressions 3, 4, and 5 -depend on the lottery line q but are independent of the payline p (proofs appear in the SI). This result follows from the fact that, in a lottery, each investigator's benefit and cost are proportional to p. 8 Thus, an investigator's ROI and the scientific efficiency of the funding program are determined by the lottery line, but are not affected by the payline. To illustrate, Fig. 4 compares an investigator's costs and benefits in a proposal competition with 45%, 30%, and 15% paylines vs. a qualifying lottery with a q = 45% lottery line and the same three paylines. The key feature of Fig. 4 is that the investigator's benefit curve in a qualifying lottery scales in such a way that her ROI is the same for any payline ≤ q. Consequently, a qualifying lottery with a lottery line of q and any payline ≤ q achieves the same scientific efficiency as a proposal competition with a payline of q.
Thus, our numerical results showing the investigator's ROI (Fig. 2B) or the scientific efficiency (Fig. 3) in a funding competition also show the efficiency of a lottery with the equivalent lottery line. That is, a lottery in which 45% of applicants qualify for the lottery has the same scientific efficiency as a proposal competition with a 45% payline, regardless of the fraction of proposals chosen for the lottery that are ultimately funded. Thus, a lottery can restore the losses in efficiency that a proposal competition suffers as paylines become small.
In the SI, we also analyze a more general type of lottery in which proposals are placed into one of several tiers, with proposals in more selective tiers awarded a greater chance of funding [25] . In a multi-tier lottery, the efficiency is entirely determined by the number of tiers and the relative probabilities of funding in each, and is independent of the payline. Numerical results (Fig. S9) illustrate that the scientific value and waste of a multitier lottery fall in between those of a proposal competition and a single-tier lottery. Thus, a multi-tier lottery 8 To see that the cost is proportional to p, we have
ξ l (t) dt. The same investigator's benefit and cost curves in a qualifying lottery with a 45% lottery line. The investigator's ROI is the same for all paylines. These results use the baseline parameter set given in the main text.
offers an intermediate design that would partially reduce the waste associated with preparing proposals, while still allowing review panels to reward the best proposals with a higher probability of funding.
DISCUSSION
Our major result is that proposal competitions are inevitably and inescapably inefficient mechanisms for funding science when the number of awards is small. The contest model presented here suggests that a partially randomized scheme for allocating funds -that is, a lottery -can restore the efficiency lost as paylines fall, albeit at the expense of reducing the average scientific value of the projects that are funded.
Why does a lottery disengage efficiency from the payline, while a proposal competition does not? For investigators, proposal competitions are, to a first approximation, all-or-nothing affairs -an investigator only obtains a substantial payoff if her grant is funded. At high paylines (or, more precisely, when the number of awards matches the number of high-value projects), investigators with high-value projects can write proposals that win funding at modest cost to themselves. As the number of awards dwindles, however, competition stiffens. Depending on the details of the assessment process, an investigator with a high-value project must either work harder for the same chance of funding, or work just as hard for a smaller chance of funding. Either way, the re-turn on her investment declines sharply. Thus, a contest is most efficient at the payline that weeds out low-value projects (e.g., Fig. S6 ). At lower paylines, however, the effort needed to signal which projects are most valuable begins to approach the value of those projects, making the funding program less worthwhile.
In a lottery, investigators do not compete for awards per se, but instead compete for admission to the lottery. The value to the investigator of being admitted to the lottery scales directly with the number of awards. It turns out that both the investigator's expected benefit and her costs of participation scale directly with the payline, and thus the payline has no effect on efficiency. If there are fewer awards than high-value projects, a lottery that weeds out the low-value projects but does not attempt to discriminate among high-value projects will facilitate scientific progress more efficiently than a contest.
This analysis also shows that extra-scientific professional incentives to pursue grant funding can damage the scientific efficiency of a proposal competition. To the extent that these extra-scientific incentives arise from administrators using grant success as a primary yardstick of professional achievement, perhaps one major benefit of adding explicit randomness to the funding mechanism would be to compel administrators to de-emphasize granting success in professional evaluations, and to look elsewhere for measures of scholarly success.
A lottery is a radical alternative, and may be politically untenable [26] . If a lottery is not viable, an alternative approach to restoring efficiency is to design a contest where the effort given to competing for awards has more direct scientific value. For example, a contest that rewards good science in its completed form -as opposed to rewarding well-crafted proposals that describe future science -motivates the actual practice of good science, and will be less wasteful at low paylines [12] . Program officers could be given the discretion to allocate some funds by proactively scouting for promising researchers or projects. Of course, a contest based on completed science or scouting has its own drawbacks, including rich-getting-richer feedback loops, a risk of new barriers to entry for investigators from historically underrepresented demographic groups, and the Goodhart's law phenomenon, whereby a metric that becomes a target ceases to be a good metric [27] . Nevertheless, it is tantalizing to envision a world in which the resources that universities currently devote to helping researchers write proposals are instead devoted to helping researchers do science.
Funding agencies often have pragmatic reasons to emphasize the meritocratic nature of their award processes. However, our model also suggests that downplaying elements of a funding competition's structure that introduce randomness to funding decisions can increase scientific waste. When applicants fail to recognize the degree to which the contest is already a lottery, they will overinvest effort in preparing proposals, to the detriment of science.
This model does not account for all of the costs or scientific benefits of a proposal competition, including the costs of administering the competition, the time lost to reviewing grant proposals, or the benefit of building scientific community through convening a review panel. Nonetheless, we suggest that the direct value of the science supported by funding awards and the disutility costs of preparing grant proposals are the predominant scientific benefits and costs of the usual proposal system, and provide a useful starting point for a more detailed accounting. This model also makes the simplifying assumption that time and money are substitutable resources with respect to how they enable scientific progress. In reality, time and money can be complementary inputs into scientific production, with relative values that will vary hugely among investigators. The present model could be extended by accounting for the sometimes complementary nature of time and money, and for researchers' different needs for both.
To be sure, much more can be done to embellish this model. However, the qualitative results -that proposal competitions become increasingly inefficient as paylines drop, and that professional pressure on investigators to pursue funding exacerbates these inefficiencies -are inherent to the structure of contests. Partial lotteries and contests that reward past success present radical alternatives for allocating funds, and are sure to be controversial. Nevertheless, whatever their other merits and drawbacks, these alternatives could restore efficiency in distributing funds that has been lost as those funds have become increasingly scarce.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank M. Lachmann for early discussions, A. Barnett and T. Bergstrom for useful feedback on an earlier draft, and B. Moldovanu for helping us articulate clearly the tension between proposal competitions and lotteries. 
SUPPORTING INFORMATION TEXT Mathematical proofs and derivations

Bid function
The bid function b(v) can be found following steps that are identical to the derivation of the first part of Proposition 8 in Hoppe, Moldovanu, & Sela [18] . We repeat that derivation here, almost fully verbatim. The derivation holds for cases where the probability of funding η(x) depends on the bid x through the bid's quantile.
To ease the notation slightly, write η(b(v) ) be the probability that an investigator with a project of value v is funded, at equilibrium. Consider two projects of values v andv, v >v, with equilibrium bids b(v) and b(v). The investigator with a project of value v should not submit a bid as if her project had valuev, and similarly for the investigator whose project has valuev. This yields:
Divide both inequalities through by g k (), rearrange, and divide through by v −v to give
Take the limit asv → v to give
Essentially, we have rescaled investigators' benefits and costs to obtain a re-scaled cost function (h(b(v))) that is the same for all investigators. Having done this, eq. S1 then says that, at equilibrium, an investigator's marginal (re-scaled) cost and marginal (re-scaled) benefit of preparing an infinitesimally stronger proposal are equal [18] . Proceeding with the derivation, multiply both sides of eq. S1 by dv to separate variables, integrate, and use h(b(0)) = h(0) = 0 to find
Take h −1 on both sides and plug back in g k (v) = (1 − k)g(v) to complete the derivation.
To demonstrate that b(v) maximizes the investigator's payoff (as opposed to minimizing it), we follow Moldovanu & Sela's "pseudo-concavity" argument [16] . This argument requires that b (v) > 0, which we establish first. To do so, note that h −1 in eq. 2 is an increasing function (because h is an increasing function), and that (v 0 + t)/g(t) > 0 in the integrand of eq. 2. Thus, to show that b (v) > 0, it suffices to show that ξ (v) > 0, that is, that the probability of being funded increases as the value of the scientific project increases. We expect this condition to hold under any reasonable model of how proposals are assessed. Basic but tedious calculus establishes that it does hold for the Clayton copula that we describe below.
Having established that b (v) > 0, the pseudoconcavity argument in [16] proceeds as follows. Let
h(x) be the payoff associated with a project of value v and a proposal of quality x. Let x = ∂ (v, x)/∂x. We claim that x > 0 for x < b(v), and x < 0 for x > b(v). These claims, together with the continuity of b(v), establish that x = b(v) maximizes (v, x) .
We first show that x > 0 for x < b(v). Choose a value of x < b(v), and let v be the value of a project that will generate a bid of x, that is,
Now differentiate x with respect to v to give the mixed derivative
Under the assumptions of our model, η (x) > 0, g (v) < 0, and h (x) > 0; thus, xv > 0. Therefore, x is an increasing function of v, and thus
The proof that x < 0 for x > b(v) follows similarly.
Copulas for noisy assessment
A bivariate copula is simply a bivariate probability distribution on the unit square with uniform marginal distributions [22] . Let U = F (v) be the actual quantile of a proposal, and let W be the assessed quantile. The joint distribution of U and W is given by the copula C(u, w) = Pr{U ≤ u, W ≤ w}. Given a value of U , the conditional distribution of W given U is C W |U (u, w) = Pr{W ≤ w|U = u} = ∂C(u, w)/∂u. (Here we use the fact that U is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.) To find ξ(v), evaluate C W |U at u = F (v) and w = 1 − p to find 1−ξ(v), the probability that an idea of value v is not funded. Take the complement to find ξ(v). Differentiate with respect to v to find ξ (v), which can then be plugged in to eq. 2.
The distribution function for a Clayton copula [23] is
The parameter θ ≥ 0 controls the strength of the association between U and W , with larger values of θ giving stronger associations (in our application, more accurate assessment of grant proposals).
Alternative parameter sets
To complement the example in the main text, we show numerical results for two alternative parameter sets. In the first alternative set, scientific value is uniformly distributed across projects, the disutility cost increases linearly with proposal quality, and assessment is less precise than we assume in the baseline parameter set. In this set, v is uniformly distributed between 1/3 and 1. We use c(v, x) = xe −v for the cost function, and we use θ = 5 in the Clayton copula (Fig. S2B) .
The second alternative parameter set captures a scenario where the pool of possible project values is bimodal, with many minimal-value projects and equally many maximal-value projects. In this alternative set, v ranges from 1/2 to 1. To construct the distribution of v, let Y be a beta random variable with both shape parameters equal to 1/2. Thus, Y has a symmetric, U-shaped distribution on the unit interval. Then v is given by (1 + Y )/2. In this parameter set, we choose c(v, x) = (1.5 − v)x 2 , and we set θ = 7.5 in the Clayton copula.
Both alternative parameter sets use k = 1/3.
Perfect discrimination
In the perfect discrimination case, we require that there is a maximum possible value of v, which we write v max . The previous derivation of the bid function does not work for perfect discrimination, because b(v) becomes a step function and thus is not differentiable. Instead, let v denote the threshold value, that is, v = F −1 (1 − p). Under perfect discrimination, the threshold investigator will break even regardless of her bid. Thus,
Consequently, it is straightforward to show that the bid function is
The following results are all immediate. First, as the payline drops, v increases, and hence x increases. (Recall that g is a strictly decreasing function, and h −1 is a strictly increasing function.) Thus, investigators with v > v experience a reduced payoff and increased costs, leading to a reduced ROI. Second, the average scientific benefit per funded proposal, which can be written as
increases as v increases. Third, as p approaches 0 from above, v approaches v max from below. Thus, in the limit, the bid function approaches
Thus, the payoff to all investigators approaches 0 as p approaches 0 from above.
Lotteries
We consider the more general case of a multi-tier lottery. Proposals deemed worthy of funding are placed into one of z tiers, with tier 1 representing the highestranked proposals, etc. Write the proportion of proposals in tier i as q i , and let π i represent the probability that a proposal placed in tier i is funded, where 1 ≥ π 1 > π 2 > . . . > π z > 0. We assume that the funding agency determines q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q z and π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π z in advance. Because the payline is still p, we must have
The single-tier lottery proposed by Fang & Casadevall [15] and others is a special case with z = 1, with a probability of funding π 1 = p/q 1 in that tier.
In a tiered lottery, the investigator's maximization problem becomes
where η i (x) is the probability that a proposal of quality x is placed in tier i. A similar derivation to the steps in eq. S1-S2 yields the bid function
We now show that the efficiency of a lottery depends entirely on the structure of the lottery, and is independent of the payline. For multi-tier lotteries, we require that the ratios of the π i 's -the probabilities of funding in each tier -are fixed. To establish these ratios, write κ i = π i /π 1 . The condition z i=1 q i π i = p implies that the probability that a proposal in tier i is funded is
as long as p ≤ i κ i q i . (If p > i κ i q i , then we would have π 1 > 1.) All of our results follow from showing that an investigator's benefit and cost are proportional to p, and thus the payline p cancels out of the efficiency calculations in eqq. 3-5. The investigator's benefit from entering the
A simple substitution shows that this benefit is proportional to p:
To show that the investigator's cost is proportional to p, we have
It thus follows that the investigator's ROI (eq. 3), the average value per funded grant (eq. 4), and the average waste per funded grant (eq. 5) are all independent of p. Fig. 3 for a three-tier lottery with equally sized tiers and a 3:2:1 ratio of funding probabilities across the tiers. The horizontal axis gives the proportion of proposals that qualify for any tier of the lottery. Scientific value and scientific waste per funded proposal are independent of the actual payline, as long as the payline is less than 2/3 of the lottery line. (If the payline exceeds 2/3 of the lottery line, then the ratios of funding across tiers will be something other than 3:2:1, and thus the average value and average cost of a funded proposal will change slightly.) All other parameter values are the same as in Fig. 3 . Note that the vertical axis in panel A does not extend to 0.
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